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Over the last decade or so, philosophers have increasingly addressed issues of 
global justice. The publication of John Rawls‟s The Law of Peoples in 1999 
seems to have been a turning point.1 To be sure, there were scattered earlier 
discussions, but since its publication, that book has served as a focus of 
debate. In this regard, it seems to be playing a similar role to that played by 
A Theory of Justice decades earlier with respect to domestic justice. In Global 
Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account, Gillian Brock takes her initial orientation 
from The Law of Peoples, and draws on some of the literature that has 
developed in reaction to it.2 However, in contrast to some of the recent 
philosophical literature, Brock is not mainly interested in taking sides in 
theoretical debates. In addition to identifying “what an abstract model of 
global justice might look like,” she is primarily concerned to show “how we 
progress from where we are now … towards what are identified as the key 
goals of global justice.” (vii) Her account includes many specific proposals 
that would make tangible contributions to the cause of global justice. These 
proposals vary in their likely effectiveness as well as their political feasibility. 
Indeed, Brock‟s endorsement of some of them is quite tentative. Still their 
cumulative force is powerful. She gives a credible account of what a “feasible 
public policy that makes progress toward global justice” (4) could look like. 
Whatever one thinks about the details of her specific proposals, she 
establishes that the continued existence of serious global injustices is not due 
                                                 
1 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard, 1999). 
2 Gillian Brock, Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account (Oxford, 2009). References to this 
work will be made parenthetically in the text. 
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to a lack of ideas or strategies for reforms and improvements but to a failure 
of political will. 
The subtitle declares that hers is “A Cosmopolitan Account,” but although 
she discusses the label in the first chapter, it is only near the end, after many 
of the details and implications of her view have been presented, that she 
considers the sense in which it is a form of cosmopolitanism. It is clear that 
she is more concerned to get the substance of the view right than she is with 
sticking to orthodox labels. On a number of points she diverges from what 
has arguably become the orthodox cosmopolitan view of global justice. 
Brock‟s version “takes seriously the equal moral worth of [all] persons, yet 
leaves scope for a defensible form of nationalism along with other legitimate 
identifications and affiliations.” (4) Similarly, she describes her position as 
“egalitarian,” but her view does not require an equal distribution of wealth, 
income, resources, or opportunities. Her egalitarianism operates at a higher 
level than most familiar egalitarian accounts of distributive justice. What is 
important, she argues, “is that people should have a decent set, of 
opportunities rather than an equal set, strictly speaking… The real concern is 
surely not with equality at any cost.” (62) The goal should be to free 
individuals from domination and to allow them to “stand in relations that 
embody equality of respect, recognition, and power.” (298) 
To identify principles of global justice, Brock develops a thought 
experiment modeled on Rawls‟s original position. Assuming a world of 
diverse communities – not only political entities, but also overlapping 
“national, religious, cultural, or linguistic groups” (48) – Brock considers 
which principles would be chosen by individuals behind a veil of ignorance to 
establish “a fair framework for interactions and relations among the world‟s 
inhabitants.” (49) In The Law of Peoples, Rawls imagines an original position 
in which the parties represent peoples, not individuals. Brock departs from 
Rawls himself and follows authors such as Beitz, Pogge, and Moellendorf who 
argue that the original position that Rawls designed to identify principles of 
domestic justice should be extended to address global justice. They argue, 
accordingly, that Rawls‟s principles of domestic justice should be applied 
globally. Along with these critics, Brock charges that for Rawls, protecting 
individuals “takes a back seat to treating peoples as equals. In so far as the 
building blocks for his theory involve strong commitments to respective 
peoples as ultimate units of equality, his view is still better described as 
statist than cosmopolitan.” (318)  
JON MANDLE 
300 
 
 Yet Brock departs dramatically from these critics when she argues that 
the parties in the original position would not choose Rawls‟s familiar two 
principles of domestic justice to apply globally. Instead, they would choose 
more modest requirements centered around “two primary guidelines of 
roughly equal importance – namely, that everyone should enjoy some equal 
basic liberties and that everyone should be protected from certain real (or 
highly probable) risks of serious harms.” (50) More specifically, “we should 
all be adequately positioned to enjoy the prospects for a decent life, as 
understood to include what is necessary to be enabled to meet our basic needs 
and those of our dependants (but with provisions firmly in place for the 
permanently or temporarily disabled to be adequately cared for), and certain 
protections for basic freedom.” (52) Although Brock favors a model based on 
satisfying human needs, she argues that this approach converges with recent 
literature on capabilities. The capabilities that Nussbaum argues are 
requirements for a life with dignity, for example, correspond to Brock‟s 
human needs. On both approaches, “what matters is what one is able to do 
and be (and not one‟s income or resources, per se).” (71) Similarly, Brock 
argues, there is a convergence between her account of needs and accounts of 
human rights. In fact, “A plausible list of human rights must be informed by 
an account of human needs. A needs-centered account is more basic than – 
and so makes plausible – an account of human rights.” (72)  
The distributive principles that Brock thinks would be chosen are 
considerably less demanding than Rawls‟s second principle of domestic 
justice. Brock argues explicitly against both fair equality of opportunity (as a 
positive ideal) and the difference principle. She concedes that there is a 
powerful intuition that “it is unfair if some are significantly disadvantaged in 
life because of morally arbitrary features.” (58) Yet, she claims that efforts to 
formulate this intuition in terms of a positive ideal for global justice have 
failed in part because of the difficulties in making cross-cultural comparisons 
of advantage. Attempts to specify a positive ideal of fair equality of 
opportunity face the following dilemma: “Either we must articulate a version 
of equality of opportunity that mentions particular social positions that are 
favoured and opportunities to occupy these positions are equalized, or we 
allow much cultural variation about what counts as a favoured social 
position and it is now the standards of living or levels of well-being that they 
enable that are to be equalized.” (61-62) The first option is insufficiently 
sensitive to cultural differences, while the second fails to identify certain 
objectionable forms of discrimination. Brock doesn‟t rule out the possibility 
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of eventually formulating a positive account, but she recommends focusing 
on obviously objectionable discrimination rather than attempting to achieve 
an ambiguous ideal of equal opportunity.  
 
Against the difference principle, Brock cites the empirical work of Norman 
Frohlich and Joe Oppenheimer, who found that in a variety of experiments 
modeling impartial choice situations, “By far the most popular choice in all 
countries was the principle with the guaranteed floor constraint.” (55) Many 
individuals apparently reject a more egalitarian standard because they fear 
that such a standard would undermine the incentive to work. Instead, they 
sought a “balance between needs, entitlements, and incentives.” (57) 
Although she recognizes that “the recommendations of the difference 
principle might converge with those of a needs-based minimum floor 
principle,” (58) Brock still holds that the empirical evidence “tells rather 
dramatically against the difference principle.” (57) 
I‟m dubious that these empirical considerations should carry much weight 
against the difference principle. First of all, the original position requires us 
to judge what would be rational to choose given its various constraints. The 
fact that a majority of individuals would make a certain choice is perhaps 
some evidence concerning which choice would be rational, but it is far from 
decisive. Second, and more importantly, there seems to be a 
misunderstanding – if not Brock‟s, then the individuals surveyed – about 
how the difference principle operates. The difference principle recognizes the 
potential importance of incentives since it allows inequalities when they act 
as incentives that ultimately benefit the least advantaged social position. 
Furthermore, as Brock recognizes, because of the difference principle‟s focus 
on the least advantaged, it is very likely that it will also ensure that 
everyone‟s basic needs are satisfied.  
The more serious confusion concerns entitlements. Rawls intends the 
difference principle to inform the design of basic institutions. It compares 
institutional designs by focusing on the least advantaged social position 
likely to emerge from an institutional choice. But it is only against an 
institutional background that individuals come to have particular 
entitlements. Without legal and economic institutions, individual 
entitlements are simply indeterminate. The laws associated with an economic 
structure specify the rules and procedures that individuals must follow in 
order properly to claim particular ownership rights. Given its proper 
institutional focus, the difference principle cannot conflict with individual 
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entitlements since it evaluates the institutional arrangement within which 
individual entitlements are determined. It is a fundamental confusion to 
suggest that an emphasis on entitlements is somehow in conflict with 
endorsing the difference principle. The difference principle is misunderstood 
when it is thought that it must be balanced against needs, entitlements, and 
incentives. 
Because Rawls intends the difference principle to apply to the political, 
legal and economic institutions, it is designed to be a principle for evaluating 
domestic, rather than global, institutions. At a global level, he endorses a 
“duty of assistance” that well-ordered societies have toward what he calls 
“burdened societies.” These are societies that “lack the political and cultural 
traditions, the human capital and know-how, and often, the material and 
technological resources needed to be well-ordered.”3 Well-ordered societies 
have a duty, as a matter of justice, to assist burden societies to become well-
ordered so that eventually they can “manage their own affairs reasonably 
and rationally.”4 Crucially, what is required is to ensure that “people‟s basic 
needs are met.”5 So, while Rawls endorses the difference principle 
domestically, he endorses something quite similar to Brock‟s basic needs 
principle globally. What is somewhat unclear is whether Brock would endorse 
Rawls‟s difference principle with regard to domestic institutions. Her 
arguments against it would seem to apply to both domestic and global 
applications. I am unsure whether Brock thinks that stronger egalitarian 
principles would be chosen domestically, and if so, why, exactly, there is a 
principled difference between the principles of domestic and of global justice. 
This raises the question of whether there are special duties toward 
compatriots. Brock holds that there are. This would seem to put her in 
agreement with liberal nationalists, though Brock considers and rejects the 
positions of several prominent liberal nationalist theorists. She believes that 
“liberal nationalists have not yet offered an adequate account of our 
obligations to non-nationals. For instance, their views on the priority we may 
give co-nationals‟ interests over non-nationals‟ are unhelpful, unclear, ad hoc, 
and show significant tension.” (249) For example, she interprets Yael Tamir‟s 
theory to require that “what we can be asked to do to help others gets 
attention only after we have attended to what we owe co-nationals.” (256) 
Similarly, she rejects David Miller‟s contention that “We owe obligations to 
                                                 
3 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p.106. 
4 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p.111. 
5 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p.38. 
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compatriots that are more extensive than those we owe to outsiders.” (263) 
Given the extent of global poverty, and our unfulfilled duties relating to it, 
Brock maintains, it is not at all obvious that our duties toward compatriots 
are more extensive. While the liberal nationalists that she discusses seem to 
take duties to compatriots as primary and attempt to build outward in the 
direction of cosmopolitan duties, Brock takes the opposite view: “Questions 
about the kind of special regard we may show to co-members of our group 
can be addressed only after there is commitment to the basic framework with 
all its protections.” (265) She follows Nussbaum in insisting that our 
“primary allegiance” is to “the worldwide community of human beings.” 
(315) 
It would help Brock‟s cause, I believe, if she were to distinguish more 
clearly between two different questions. First, there is the issue of the content 
of a duty – for example, whether one is required to promote an equal 
distribution of resources or merely a threshold conception in which everyone 
is entitled to a certain minimal share. Second, there is the problem of the 
strength of a duty – for example, how one is to resolve conflicts among 
particular duties and other moral ideals. Too often discussions of nationalism 
and cosmopolitanism fail to attend to this distinction. Brock comes close, but 
does not quite make this point explicitly. For example, she points out that 
“While we can have different kinds of obligations, my analysis shows that 
our basic obligations to others cannot diminish with distance.” (275) At the 
same time, however, she concedes that “our strongest obligations may 
generally be to those family and friends with whom we have close personal 
relationships.” (275) What is merely implicit in the second quote, but 
perhaps suggested in the first, is that we have different kinds of obligations to 
our family and friends than we do to others. This opens the possibility that 
we could also have different kinds of obligations to our compatriots while at 
the same time insisting that the cosmopolitan duties that we owe to all do 
not vary in strength with distance.  
In fact, I myself think that something like that is correct. We have 
cosmopolitan duties to help ensure that human rights are protected, 
including a right to resources necessary to satisfy basic needs. While the 
strength of this duty may vary with wealth and instrumental considerations 
of effectiveness, it extends across borders and does not vary with distance as 
such. On the other hand, we have egalitarian duties toward our compatriots 
and merely ensuring that their basic needs are met, while necessary, is 
inadequate for domestic justice. As noted above, it is unclear whether Brock 
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would endorse this higher standard for domestic justice. The point here, 
however, is that despite their different content, we cannot yet say which of 
these duties of justice is stronger in the sense of which should take priority in 
the event that they conflict (for example, due to limited resources). Brock 
points out that it is not obvious that we should think of the cosmopolitan 
duty to protect basic human rights as a positive duty, since, following Pogge, 
she argues that by imposing an unjust global order, we are “failing to 
discharge this negative duty appropriately.” (287, cf.122) But even if we do 
think of it as a positive duty, we cannot assume that it is weaker than 
negative duties that we might have toward our compatriots. Although it is 
widely believed that negative duties are stronger than positive ones, that is 
not always the case. At most we might think that a negative duty is stronger 
than the corresponding positive duty with the same content. For example, it is 
widely believed that it is worse to actively kill than it is to passively fail to 
prevent a killing. But it is not at all obvious that egalitarian domestic duties 
must always be stronger than a positive duty to protect basic human rights 
globally. Although domestic duties may be more demanding than global 
duties in the sense that they are more egalitarian, they may not be stronger 
in the sense of taking priority when domestic and global duties conflict. 
While not advocating a global state, Brock argues that strengthening or 
creating various global institutions would greatly promote the cause of global 
justice. I will mention some of these proposals below, but one thing that 
many of them share is that each facilitates collective deliberation. One worry 
is that such dialogue will simply uncover irreconcilable conflicts among 
different societies with nothing to motivate concessions, resolution, or 
compliance. That, a skeptic might argue, is exactly what a shared national 
identity can provide and why international institutions will always be weaker 
than their national counterparts. Brock does not dismiss this concern, but 
argues that there is no reason in principle to think that it cannot be 
overcome. Identification does not “naturally” reside only at the level of the 
nation-state, and virtues that are learned locally may be applied more 
broadly. She writes, “If we had really learned virtues, such as, public-
spiritedness, a sense of justice, the capacity to respect others‟ rights and 
moderate claims accordingly, civility, and tolerance, it is hard to see how 
these virtues would „be able to stop themselves‟ once the boundaries of nation 
states had been reached.” (99) The creation of international institutions 
which facilitate dialogue might themselves help foster international 
identification and allegiance. In fact, the creation of shared institutions has 
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arguably been one way in which large multinational states have formed 
collective identities for themselves.  
Although Brock argues that it is important that these global institutions 
be democratic, she works with what appears to be a rather weak 
understanding of “democracy.” She defends a model of democracy in which it 
is less a matter of “allow[ing] more participation in collective decision-
making” than a matter of having institutions that are “more responsive to 
people‟s interests and [are] better at securing people‟s interests.” (105-106) 
No doubt she is right that “it is important that some officials have partial 
independence from popular opinion to allow the integration into 
policymaking of a more dispassionate and temporally extended view of the 
public interest.” (107) Furthermore, I believe that such models can be 
compatible with democracy. Still, such institutions are justified less by ideals 
of democracy than by broader considerations of justice. 
Brock‟s discussion of immigration is characteristically subtle and serves as 
a good illustration of several attractive features of her account. While some 
cosmopolitans argue for open borders, Brock is skeptical that by itself this 
would do much to serve the cause of global justice, especially since the “brain 
drain” from poor to wealthy countries “can have disastrous effects” on 
developing countries. (198) Brock considers the brain drain among health 
professionals in detail and argues that “in sub-Saharan Africa basic health 
care delivery is significantly threatened by this phenomenon.” (199) 
Obviously, the reason so many health care professionals who are trained in 
poor countries want to leave is because they seek better working conditions, 
pay, or professional development that poor countries are not able to provide. 
Brock argues that wealthy countries should provide compensation to the 
poor countries in exchange for granting visas to health care professionals. 
“Compensatory measures could take a number of forms, including 
technological, technical, or financial assistance, the setting up of training 
programmes, or instituting (and helping to enforce) compulsory service 
before departure is permitted.” (202) This obviously would interfere with 
unencumbered travel across borders, but Brock argues that this would not 
interfere unjustly with “individuals‟ relevant freedoms” since they would still 
be able to immigrate as long as the relevant conditions are satisfied. (203) 
Importantly, such arrangements could potentially be attractive to both 
developing and developed countries.  
Brock‟s proposals with regard to a carbon tax, a Tobin tax, and greater 
transparency in economic transactions share this and other important 
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features. While with any such proposal there will be some costs, it is 
characteristic of her proposals that the parties often will mutually benefit 
from them. “We should not underestimate the role self-interest can play in 
moving us in the right direction.” (329) Each of her proposals would make a 
concrete contribution toward ensuring that every individual is able to satisfy 
her basic needs and participate fairly in collective activities. Taken together, 
they would dramatically improve such prospects. Furthermore, Brock insists 
that “We can make considerable progress without universal agreement on 
many issues.” (330) She cites the International Criminal Court (ICC) as an 
example of a global institution that has advanced the cause of justice without 
universal participation, most notably the United States which has not 
ratified the Rome Treaty. 
The ICC, created by the Rome Treaty in 1998, serves as an important 
illustration of international institutions that contribute to global justice 
without displacing state governance. The ICC limits itself to the most serious 
crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity, and it does so “only 
when national courts are either unwilling or unable to act appropriately.” 
(167) Because of its “complementarity” with national courts, the ICC does 
not undermine national sovereignty. Brock supports this model, and extends 
it to consider also the possibility of humanitarian intervention in cases of 
severe human rights violations. International authorization of humanitarian 
intervention might seem to constitute an even greater and impermissible 
threat to sovereignty, but Brock argues that sovereignty should not be 
understood as unconditional. Still, there must be protections against 
unwarranted interventions, so Brock advocates the creation of a “Vital 
Interests Protection Organization.” In extreme cases, the VIPO would 
authorize “the use of force to restore or ensure that relevant vital interests 
are adequately protected.” (177) The composition and powers of the VIPO, 
however, are underspecified. At one point, Brock suggests that it would be 
composed of “representatives of all nations” and that with “a unanimous 
decision is reached by such a body, fears about abuse of power should be 
allayed” (178), yet this is obviously unworkable. Brock also leaves unclear 
whether it would authorize individual countries to intervene or whether 
somehow military forces would be under a unified command.  
One of Brock‟s most important goals is to refute those she calls “feasibility 
skeptics.” She rebuts several arguments that purport to show that “realizing 
the goals of global justice is so wildly unrealistic in practice that, at best, 
such models must remain as theorists‟ wishes about how the world should 
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be.” (325) While stopping short of predicting that any of her proposals will 
actually be adopted, she does believe that “there is reason to be optimistic 
about our prospects for reforming the system of global governance that 
already dominates our lives.” (332) Along some dimensions, I share her 
optimism concerning improved prospects for global justice. While there are 
still ideologues who insist that only rapid and radical trade liberalization can 
achieve economic development, it has become clear that while integration 
into global markets can often act to promote economic growth, “The uniform 
model advocated by traditional free trade advocates does not always work for 
all countries in all circumstances.” (237) This realization promises to improve 
the prospects of the world‟s poor. In other dimensions, however, I am more 
pessimistic. While it is true that “Several countries have already enacted a 
carbon tax” (132) others – including the two countries that are together 
responsible for more than 40% of the carbon dioxide emitted into the 
atmosphere annually, the United States and China – have not.6  
But Brock‟s work should not be evaluated on the basis of its optimism or 
pessimism. She goes further than most philosophers in suggesting various 
policy mechanisms that would advance the cause of global justice. It is not 
her job to predict success. As Rawls points out, showing that a “reasonably 
just political and social order both at home and abroad is possible … [itself] 
suffices to banish the dangers of resignation and cynicism. By showing how 
the social world may realize the features of a realistic utopia, political 
philosophy provides a long-term goal of political endeavor, and in working 
toward it gives meaning to what we can do today.”7 Brock‟s work shows the 
direction of global justice and what we can do today. It clearly establishes 
that our failure to move in that direction is, indeed, our collective failure.8  
                                                 
6 http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=749  
7 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p.128. 
8 Thanks to Gillian Brock, Kristen Hessler, and Jay Mandle for comments and 
suggestions. 
